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 “There’s an app for that.”1 These days, there’s an app for nearly everything—be it 
a dinner reservation, cleaning service, or ride-sharing service.2 Modern technology 
has brought about a shift to a sharing economy that is more collaborative than the 
traditional, competitive economy.3 In a sharing economy, consumers are connected 
with companies through apps that utilize unused resources.4 Because business laws 
were developed for a competitive economy, this collaborative approach does not 
always fit squarely within the current legal system—an issue that the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals faced in the 2018 case Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, Inc.5
 In Cullinane, the court considered whether certain users had entered into an 
enforceable contract with Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”).6 The issues before the 
court were whether the plaintiffs had manifested their assent to Uber’s “Terms of 
Service & Privacy Policy” (“Agreement”) and whether the arbitration clause set out 
in the Agreement was “reasonably conspicuous”7 to its users.8 Relying on Ajemian v. 
Yahoo!, Inc.,9 the court held that the arbitration clause in the Agreement was not 
reasonably conspicuous and the plaintiffs did not manifest their assent to form a 
contract.10
 This Case Comment contends that the Cullinane court incorrectly held that 
Uber’s arbitration clause in the Agreement was unenforceable for two reasons. First, 
the court improperly relied on Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., because the issue of online 
contract formation is an area of unsettled law, and the court should have therefore 
relied on precedent from other jurisdictions. If it had done so, it would have held that 
the Agreement was enforceable because its terms were hyperlinked on an uncluttered 
page and part of the registration process.11 Second, the court erred in holding that 
the Agreement was unenforceable because it failed to recognize that online contracts 
are on equal footing with paper contracts.12 The court’s decision creates public policy 
1. Doug Gross, Apple Trademarks ‘There’s an App for That’, CNN (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.cnn.
com/2010/TECH/mobile/10/12/app.for.that/index.html.
2. See Yanelys Crespo, Uber v. Regulation: “Ride-Sharing” Creates a Legal Gray Area, 25 U. Miami Bus. L. 
Rev. 79, 81 (2016).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See generally id. at 83; Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2018).
6. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 55.
7. Id. at 62 (quoting Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 612 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013)).
8. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–63.
9. Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 604.
10. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 64.
11. Id. at 59; Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 611–13.
12. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that while the internet 
has exposed courts to new contract issues, it has not changed contract principles).
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concerns for the future of online contracts because it leads to confusion in the laws 
governing online contract formation.13
 Uber is a popular ride-sharing service that licensed a mobile application (“Uber 
App”).14 First-time users who wished to use Uber had to register by creating an 
account on either Uber’s website or through the Uber App.15 Between December 31, 
2012, and January 10, 2014, plaintiffs Rachel Cullinane, Ross McDonagh, Jacqueline 
Núñez, and Elizabeth Schaul downloaded the Uber App to their smartphones.16 
During 2013 and 2014, after their rides, Uber charged each plaintiff additional 
surcharges and tolls on top of the actual transportation charges.17
 At the time, this registration process required navigation through three separate 
screens.18 The first screen, titled “Create an Account,” prompted users to enter an 
e-mail address and phone number, and to create a password.19 The next screen, titled 
“Create a Profile,” asked users to enter their full name and upload a picture.20 The third 
screen, titled “Link Card” or “Link Payment,” required users to provide a method of 
payment.21 This screen had a thick bar that read “Link Card.”22 To the left was a 
“CANCEL” button, and to the right was a button, less visible and inoperable, that read 
“DONE.”23 A blank field text prompted users to enter their credit card information 
with light grey numbers and depicted a credit card icon, as an example.24 On this page, 
a pop-up automatic number pad filled up half the screen—further prompting users to 
13. See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 60 –61; see also Ty Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of 
Legalese: Law and Technology of Internet Agreements, 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 79, 89 (2008).
14. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 55. Uber licenses its Uber App to the public so that users can request transportation 
services. Id.
15. Id. Creating accounts on Uber allows users to request rides from independent third-party providers. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Núñez used the Uber App on September 13, 2013, for transportation to Boston Logan International 
Airport and was charged $8.75 for the Massport surcharge and toll. Id. Cullinane used the Uber App from 
Boston Logan International Airport on June 29, 2014, and was charged $5.25 for the East Boston Toll and 
$8.75 for the Massport surcharge. Id. Schaul used the Uber App to and from Logan Airport and was also 
charged the $8.75 Massport surcharge. Id. McDonagh used the Uber App for multiple trips, and on 
various occasions was charged $5.25 for the East Boston Toll and $8.75 for the Massport surcharge. Id.
18. Id. at 56.
19. Id. This screen notified users that Uber used e-mails and phone numbers for ride confirmations and 
receipts. Id.
20. Id. This screen also informed users that their name and photo are used to help their driver identify 
them. Id.
21. Id. Plaintiffs Núñez and Schaul were presented with a third screen that was titled “Link Card,” while 
plaintiffs Cullinane and McDonagh were presented with a screen that was titled “Link Payment.” Id. 
Although the titles of the payment screens were different, the court noted that these differences were 
immaterial to the underlying dispute. Id.
22. Id. at 57.
23. Id.
24. Id. The blank field text was white, which contrasted with the black background of the rest of the screen. 
Id.
290
CULLINANE v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 64 | 2019/20
enter their credit card information.25 Below the blank text field, users were met with 
the instructions “scan your card,” that had a camera icon next to it, and “enter promo 
code,” that had a bullet-shaped icon in a circle.26 On this screen, the phrase, “[b]y 
creating an Uber account, you agree to the Terms of Service & Privacy Policy,” appeared 
above a hyperlinked box that read “Terms of Service & Privacy Policy.”27
 The “Link Payment” screen was similar to the “Link Card” screen, but instead of 
the automatic number pad, there was a PayPal28 button.29 In between the blank text 
field and the PayPal button, was text that said “OR,” indicating users had two 
payment options.30 Below the PayPal button was identical text that read, “by creating 
an Uber Account you agree to the” directly above “Terms of Service & Privacy 
Policy” in bold white text enclosed by a gray rectangle.31 If a user input their credit 
card information, the keyboard would change and the screen would almost identically 
resemble the “Link Card” screen.32
 The Agreement was a ten-page document that was accessible during the 
registration process through a hyperlink.33 If a user clicked on the “Terms of Service 
& Privacy Policy” hyperlink, they would be able to view another screen with “Terms 
& Conditions” and “Privacy Policy” buttons.34 The Agreement was displayed once a 
user clicked “Terms & Conditions.”35 However, users were not required to click any 
of these buttons, or access the Agreement, in order to complete their registration.36 
There was also a Dispute Resolution37 section in the Agreement.38 This section 
bound Uber users to arbitration and explained the process and governing body for 
25. Id.
26. Id. The record did not definitively conclude whether the “scan your card” or “enter promo code” buttons 
were clickable. Id.
27. Id. at 57–58.
28. PayPal is an “alternative payments services company,” that allows for buyers to purchase goods online 
without revealing their sensitive personal information to a seller. Eric Pacifici, Making PayPal Pay: 
Regulation E and its Application to Alternative Payment Services, 13 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 89, 92 (2015).
29. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 58.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 57.
32. Id. at 58.




37. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2020). See also Tala Esmali, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Legal Info. Inst. 
(June 8, 2017), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution. Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) refers to the process of settling disputes outside of the courtroom and may include 
negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. Id. States have begun to experiment in 
implementing ADR programs due to the high cost of litigation and burdened court dockets. Id.
38. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 59.
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arbitration.39 While the plaintiffs claim they neither clicked the “Terms of Service” 
and “Privacy Policy” links, nor viewed any of the subsequent screens, they all 
registered, created accounts, and used the App.40
 In November 2014, Cullinane and Núñez filed a putative class action suit41 
against Uber in Massachusetts Superior Court.42 The initial complaint alleged five 
causes of action.43 One month later, Uber filed a Notice of Removal44 in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, relying on the Class Action 
Fairness Act.45 Plaintiffs Cullinane and Núñez then amended their complaint by 
adding Schaul and McDonagh as plaintiffs and a new cause of action for unfair and 
deceptive practices.46
39. Id. The Agreement indicated that the arbitration would be handled by the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA). Id. It also provided that the Commercial Arbitration Rules and Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) would govern the interpretation and enforcement of the Agreement. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A § 9(2) (West 2020). A putative class action law suit allows a person 
to bring an action with a hypothetical group of people, that the plaintiff represents, against a party that 
has used unfair or deceptive practices and caused similar injuries to other persons. Id.
42. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 59.
43. Id. at 60. The initial class action suit sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief on behalf of a 
class of Uber passengers in Massachusetts. Complaint at 1, Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.14-
14750-DPW, 2016 U.S. Dist. WL 3751652 (D. Mass. July 11, 2016), rev’d 893 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2018). 
Count I of the complaint alleged that Uber’s fictitious and inf lated charges was a breach of contract 
because it violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 13. Count II alleged that Uber 
breached an express warranty. Id. at 13–14. Count III alleged that Uber’s disclaimer of the warranty 
obligations created by its express representations of their services violated the prohibition on these types 
of disclaimers. Id. at 14. Count IV alleged that Uber’s express representations about safety and pricing 
transparency were contradicted and negated by its disclaimer of the warranties it created by those 
representations, and was therefore unreasonable. Id. at 14–15. Count V alleged that the plaintiffs 
unwittingly conferred economic benefits on Uber and that Uber’s demand and acceptance of these 
fictitious or inf lated fees, knowing it was unentitled to them, was unjust and inequitable. Id. at 15.
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) –(b) (2020). Civil actions can be removed from a state court to federal district 
court in the district and division where the action is pending. Id. Removal must be within thirty days 
after receipt by the defendant or thirty days after the service of summons has been filed. Id. See also 28 
U.S.C. § 1441. Removal can be based on diversity of citizenship or the existence of a federal issue. 28 
U.S.C. § 1446(a).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The Class Action Fairness Act states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs, and is a class action in which—(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen 
of a State different from any defendant; (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a 
foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a 
State; or (C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant 
is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
 Id. See also Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 60.
46. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 60. Massachusetts law declares “unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce” as unlawful. Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann. ch. 93A § 2(a).
292
CULLINANE v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 64 | 2019/20
 Once in federal court, Uber moved to either compel arbitration and stay 
proceedings,47 or to dismiss the case48 because of the Agreement’s arbitration clause.49 
Plaintiffs then amended their complaint in August 2015, dropping all causes of 
action except for the Chapter 93A violation and common law claim for unjust 
enrichment.50 The district court granted Uber’s motion to compel arbitration and 
dismissed the case.51 In February 2017, plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision 
to the First Circuit Court of Appeals arguing that the arbitration clause was 
unenforceable.52
 The arbitration agreements found in contracts today are rooted in Ancient Greek 
and Roman law.53 Information on the earliest arbitration agreements is limited 
because these agreements were considered private matters, and thus, not published.54 
English law, which influenced American law, treated arbitration agreements with 
disdain because such agreements got in the way of the courts and what was considered 
the proper administration of justice.55 Ref lecting this notion, England passed a 
statute in the sixteenth century prohibiting agreements that barred lawsuits and 
courts held that arbitration agreements were revocable any time before the parties 
received awards.56
47. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2020), outlining a stay of proceedings, reads as:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any 
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the 
court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such 
suit or proceeding is preferable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on 
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has 
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the 
stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
 Id.
48. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
A motion to dismiss may be granted if the other party can present any of the defenses, such 
as: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction; (3) improper 
venue; (4) insufficient process; (5) insufficient service of process; (6) failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted; and (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.
 Id.




53. See William M. Howard, The Evolution of Contractually Mandated Arbitration, 48 Arb. J. 27, 27–28 
(1993) (discussing the history of arbitration agreements).
54. Id. at 27.
55. Id. at 28.
56. Id. at 27–28.
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 Historically, American law has similarly limited arbitration agreements.57 In 
1870, the Supreme Court held that a contract cannot “entirely close the access to the 
courts of law.”58 Four decades later, however, the Sixth Circuit held that parties could 
not revoke an arbitration agreement after an award was given.59 In 1920, New York 
passed the New York Arbitration Act,60 which validated arbitration agreements, 
allowed the stay of court proceedings, and prohibited revocation of arbitration 
agreements.61 Five years later, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).62 
The FAA required courts to enforce arbitration agreements in maritime transactions 
and interstate commerce.63 The Act was challenged in court, and in 1932, the 
Supreme Court held that the FAA did not unconstitutionally infringe on the 
Constitution’s maritime jurisdiction of federal courts.64
 Courts began to view arbitration more favorably throughout the 1960s, whereas 
courts in the 1970s were unclear as to whether they favored or disfavored arbitration 
agreements.65 In 1983, the Supreme Court indicated its preference for arbitration in 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., holding that the 
FAA created a “federal substantive law of arbitrability applicable to any arbitration 
agreement.”66
 Although there is a “liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”67 arbitration 
agreements are subject to limitations and strict guidelines to ensure proper 
enforcement. In contracts, including online contracts, a company usually uses the 
57. Id. at 28.
58. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 452 (1874) (holding that arbitration agreements and agreements that 
limit access to courts may impede the “administration of justice” because courts and the law should give 
the right to remedy, not a pre-agreed upon contract).
59. See generally Toledo S.S. Co. v. Zenith Trans. Co., 184 F. 391, 396 (6th Cir. 1911) (holding that because 
the question submitted to the arbitrator involved judicial functions, it could not be revoked).
60. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7503 (McKinney 2020).
61. See Howard, supra note 53, at 28.
62. Id.
63. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2020).
64. See Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 279 (1932).
65. Compare Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974) (holding that an employee would not 
be forced to arbitrate an employment discrimination claim), with Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 
U.S. 506, 519–20 (1974) (holding that an arbitration agreement supersedes adjudication), and Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 315, 317–18 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that an 
arbitration provision that incorporated a standard clause recommended by the AAA was broad and 
comprehensive, and would cover a fraud dispute, and thus arbitration was the proper method to resolve 
the dispute), and United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1960) (holding that 
the Supreme Court has limited power when the parties have already agreed to an arbitration agreement).
66. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that any 
state law that restricts arbitration is preempted).
67. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 (2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 
460 U.S. at 24); Oldroyd v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 134 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1998) (“There is a strong federal 
policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”).
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American Arbitration Association (AAA) to help administer the terms of service 
and arbitration clauses.68 Typically, parties are not required to arbitrate unless they 
have agreed to arbitration in advance.69 However, the transition from express written 
agreements to those that are embedded in online agreements has complicated the 
analysis of whether parties have actually agreed to arbitrate.
 Online agreements fall into one of two categories: browsewrap agreements and 
clickwrap agreements.70 Browsewrap agreements are agreements that website users 
agree to by merely using the website and are usually at the bottom of a page in a 
hyperlink.71 Clickwrap agreements require affirmative assent to terms of service and 
use by the user, who is required to click a box that reads, “I agree.”72 Although courts 
favor enforcing arbitration clauses in express written contracts, the law of arbitration 
clauses in online agreements is not as straightforward.73 For instance, it is unclear 
whether a court will enforce browsewrap agreements because of the uncertainty as to 
whether a user has actually assented to the underlying terms of these agreements. 
Because this is a developing area of the law, there are jurisdictional splits on whether 
to enforce an online contract and its arbitration clause.74
 The arbitration clause in Uber’s Agreement was the basis of one of these 
jurisdictional splits.75 In Cullinane, Uber asserted that the online presentation of its 
Agreement was conspicuous enough to bind the plaintiffs to the contract.76 It argued 
that whether the plaintiffs chose to click through the terms was irrelevant because the 
terms were visually and contextually conspicuous.77 In asserting this argument, Uber 
noted that the page that linked to the Agreement had only twenty-six words that were 
in a larger, bolded font, and highlighted by a box.78 Therefore, Uber argued, because it 
68. See Sherman Kahn, Administering Arbitration Clauses in Online Terms of Service Agreements, 
SociallyAware (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.sociallyawareblog.com/2013/04/29/administering-
arbitration-clauses-in-online-terms-of-service-agreements/ (explaining the use of arbitration clauses by 
companies in terms of use agreements).
69. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (holding 
that arbitration agreements are meant to be consensual and not coercive).
70. See Robert Terenzi, Jr., Friending Privacy: Toward Self-Regulation of Second Generation Social Networks, 
20 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1049, 1078 (2010).
71. Restatement of Consumer Contracts § 2, at 35 (Am. Law Inst., Discussion Draft 2017). In a 
browsewrap contract, there is no “I agree” button to click on. Id. “The website includes a link to another 
page with the standard terms, and consumers, by proceeding with the purchase or simply by continuing 
to use the website, are deemed to have adopted the standard terms as part of the contract.” Id.
72. See Terenzi, Jr., supra note 70, at 1076.
73. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
74. Liz Kramer, Federal Circuits Split on Whether Uber Can Enforce Arbitration Clause, Arbitration Nation 
( July 1, 2018), https://www.arbitrationnation.com/federal-circuits-split-whether-uber-can-enforce-
arbitration-clause/.
75. Id.
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was apparent that there was a hyperlink that would have brought users to the 
Agreement, the Agreement was sufficiently conspicuous, and thus, bound the parties.79
 The plaintiffs argued that the arbitration clause was not enforceable because 
Uber’s Agreement was unclear. Further, they asserted that because they did not 
mutually assent to its terms, the arbitration clause was unenforceable—as mutual 
assent is essential to contract formation.80 The plaintiffs reasoned that an online 
contract’s terms must be clear and conspicuous, and because the terms of the 
Agreement were not reasonably conspicuous, they should not have been bound to its 
terms.81 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that because they were not required to 
access, read, or assent to the Agreement, they should not be required to arbitrate.82
 The Cullinane court agreed with the plaintiffs and refused to grant Uber’s motion 
to compel arbitration.83 It relied on the rule set forth in Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., which 
addressed the issue of forum selection clauses in online contracts.84 The rule set forth 
by the Ajemian court outlines that contract terms must be reasonably communicated 
to the user and that user must unambiguously assent to its terms.85 The terms in an 
online contract must be conspicuous so as to be written, displayed, or presented in a 
way that a reasonable person would notice them.86 In Cullinane, the court found that 
the terms of the Agreement were not conspicuous, and thus, Uber did not reasonably 
communicate these terms to the plaintiffs.87
 The Cullinane court first analyzed the hyperlink to the Agreement and noted 
that it was in a rectangular box in bolded text, as compared to most hyperlinks which 
are usually blue and underlined.88 Because the hyperlink was not presented in its 
usual manner, the court held that a reasonable user may not have been aware that the 
box was a hyperlink connecting them to a contract.89 The court further noted that 
the overall content of both the “Link Card” and “Link Payment” screens indicated 
that the hyperlink was not conspicuous, relying on the fact that all three screens 
contained other terms with similar features.90 The court reasoned that because the 
hyperlink was included with other words that had similar or larger font, typeface, 
79. Id.
80. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants at 26, Cullinane, 893 F.3d 53 (No. 16-023).
81. Id. at 31–39.
82. Id. at 36–48.
83. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 64.
84. See 987 N.E.2d 604, 610–15 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
85. Id. at 611–12.
86. See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 1-201(b)(10)); see also Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 156D, § 1.40 (defining the term “conspicuous” as “written so that a reasonable person against 
whom the writing is to operate should have noticed it”).
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and other noticeable attributes, a user’s attention was probably not going to be focused 
on the hyperlink, and thus, it was not conspicuous.91
 The First Circuit Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Agreement was 
unenforceable. First, the court erred by relying on the holding and reasoning of 
Ajemian. Because online contract formation is an area of unsettled law, the court 
should have analyzed precedent from other jurisdictions in order to reach its 
decision.92 Had the court done so, it would have held the Agreement enforceable 
because its terms were hyperlinked on an uncluttered page and were connected to the 
registration process.93 Second, the court failed to recognize that the online contract 
should have been treated the same as a paper contract. The court’s decision leads to a 
multitude of public policy concerns because its decision creates unclear precedent as 
to the interpretation of online contract formation.
 The first error of the court, in holding that the Agreement was unenforceable, 
was that it failed to analyze precedent from other jurisdictions in reaching its 
decision. The First Circuit had to apply Massachusetts state law when analyzing 
Uber’s online contract.94 However, if a federal court is faced with an unsettled area of 
law, it must look to “analogous state court decisions, persuasive opinions from courts 
of other jurisdictions, learned treatises, and any relevant policy rationales.”95 Here, 
the Cullinane court failed to recognize that the issue of online contract formation is 
an unsettled area of law in Massachusetts, and thus, should have considered precedent 
from other jurisdictions.96 Instead, the court relied on the Massachusetts Appeals 
Court’s decision in Ajemian—the only case in Massachusetts, at the time, involving 
online contract formation.97
 Had the First Circuit analyzed persuasive precedent from sister circuit and state 
court decisions, it would have found Uber’s arbitration clause to be enforceable 
because the plaintiffs were notified of the Agreement throughout the registration 
process.98 A sign-in-wrap contract, a type of browsewrap agreement, does not require 
a website user’s affirmative acceptance to the website’s terms of use, so long as the 
91. Id.
92. See Patterson v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121 (D.R.I. 2012) (explaining that when 
a federal court must interpret unsettled state law, it should look at how the highest court would rule and 
decide based on that analysis).
93. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63.
94. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 204 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1938) (outlining that a federal court should typically apply 
state laws in analyzing contract formation).
95. See Corporate Techs., Inc. v. Harnett, 731 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that when the highest 
court of a state has unsettled law, the court should look at “persuasive adjudications of sister states” and 
“public policy considerations”); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., 133 F.3d 141, 151 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying 
a sister circuit’s rule on a matter of first impression); Blinzler v. Marriott Int’l, 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st 
Cir. 1996) (holding that when a state court has not decided on an issue, a circuit court should look to 
other state court decisions, sister circuit decisions, treatises, and public policy).
96. Patterson, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 121.
97. Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 611 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
98. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 59.
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website notifies users of its “terms of use” when creating an account.99 A sign-in-
wrap agreement may be valid when the “terms and conditions” are hyperlinked and 
are next to the only button that allows the user to continue using the website.100
 Courts have held contracts that hyperlink “terms and conditions,” next to the 
only button that allows a user to advance through the website, to be reasonably 
conspicuous.101 Following this line of reasoning, Uber’s terms and conditions were 
reasonably conspicuous because the terms were hyperlinked as one of the only links 
on the payment page.102 One of the most important factors courts consider when 
determining conspicuousness is whether the terms of service were buried at the 
bottom of a page or within a cluttered web page with other prompts and links.103 In 
the 2012 case Fteja v. Facebook, the Southern District of New York found that 
Facebook’s agreement was sufficiently conspicuous because the terms of service were 
not buried at the bottom of a page and it was clear to users that Facebook was trying 
to convey its terms of service.104 The plaintiff in Fteja clicked a “sign up” button in 
order to create a Facebook account and the court held that by doing so, he agreed to 
the terms of service.105
 Applying this standard, the Cullinane court should have held that the Agreement 
was reasonably conspicuous. The hyperlinked Agreement was not buried in the 
bottom of the page, but rather, was one of the few items found on Uber’s registration 
page.106 Similar to how Facebook users in Fteja agreed to the terms of service by 
signing up,107 Uber users had to press “DONE” to indicate that they agreed to the 
99. Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
100. See Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 908–12 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding an 
arbitration agreement enforceable when users had to click “accept” before proceeding and were also 
informed that clicking the button indicated acceptance). There are two other situations in which online 
contracts are enforced. One situation is when the user signs up for the website by affirmatively agreeing 
to the “terms of service” and is then presented with “terms of use” hyperlinks on later visits. Berkson, 97 
F. Supp. 3d at 399–401. The other is when the notice of the hyperlinked “terms and conditions” is 
present on multiple successive webpages. Id. at 401.
101. See Fteja v. Facebook, 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that the hyperlinked terms 
and conditions “appear to be a so-called ‘browsewrap agreement’” and that “several courts have enforced 
browsewrap agreements”) (citation omitted).
102. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 58.
103. See generally Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that several 
screens containing hyperlinks to a website’s terms of use located directly next to the link used to advance 
were so situated that a reasonably prudent internet user would know and take note of their existence); 
Sultan v. Coinbase, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 3d 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that a link to relevant terms of 
agreement contained on a page with a “minimalist layout” and “few distractions” would provide users 
with a clear signal that their account would be subject to those terms and conditions).
104. Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
105. Id.
106. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 58.
107. Id. at 58.
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Agreement’s terms.108 This “DONE” option was located next to the “Terms of 
Service & Privacy Policy” hyperlink. Because the Agreement was neither buried at 
the bottom of the page nor on a cluttered page during the registration process, it was 
reasonably conspicuous.109
 In the 2017 case Meyer v. Uber Technologies, the Second Circuit also held that a 
sign-in-wrap contract was reasonably conspicuous when the webpage was uncluttered 
and required no scrolling to view the terms of service.110 The fact that the user did 
not need to scroll, meaning the terms were plain for a reasonable user to see, coincided 
with the court’s reasoning in Fteja.111 The court in Meyer also considered whether 
the terms of service were tied to the registration process. If the terms of service were 
presented to the user to click on as part of the registration process, the court would 
hold it to be reasonably conspicuous, and the contract would be enforceable.112 Again, 
displaying the terms of service plainly to the user guided the court’s decision.113 In 
Cullinane, the Agreement was tied to the terms of service, required no scrolling, and 
was on an uncluttered page.114 The “Terms of Service & Privacy Policy” button was 
directly below the payment information input. Users could not proceed unless they 
filled in their payment information and thus, would likely have seen the hyperlinked 
terms.115 The Agreement in Cullinane is similar to the agreement in Meyer in that 
users had to fill out the payment information before registering for the service.116 
The Agreement is also analogous to the agreements in both Meyer and Fteja in that 
“Terms of Service & Privacy Policy” link was plainly presented to the user and 
required no searching or scrolling. Had the Cullinane court analyzed whether the 
terms of service were tied to the registration process, as the Meyer court did, it would 
have likely found the Agreement enforceable.
 The First Circuit ignored the distinctions made by other courts in determining 
whether Uber’s online agreement was reasonably conspicuous.117 The court mistakenly 
chose to analyze the online arbitration clause presented in Cullinane the same way 
the Massachusetts Appeals Court had in Ajemian. If the First Circuit had made a 
categorical distinction between the type of agreement in Ajemian and Cullinane, and 
analyzed online arbitration clauses as an unsettled area of law, the court’s holding 
would have likely been different.118
108. Id. at 57.
109. Id.
110. 868 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2017).
111. Fteja v. Facebook, 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
112. Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78.
113. Id.
114. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 59.
115. Id. at 63–64.
116. Id. at 63.
117. Id. at 64.
118. See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78; Fteja v. Facebook, 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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 The second error of the Cullinane court was that it failed to recognize that the 
rules of contract formation remain the same whether contracts are formed online or 
on paper.119 Whether a party reads or understands a contract is irrelevant when 
determining if they will be bound to its terms.120 Further, a party can be bound to a 
contract by implicit acceptance.121 When an offeree accepts a benefit of services with 
knowledge of the offer, the taking of the offer is considered an acceptance and is 
binding.122 Therefore, it should be irrelevant whether app or website users, like the 
plaintiffs, affirmatively agree to the terms of service by clicking a box signifying that 
they “read and understood the terms” so long as the terms are present in the contract.123
 Furthermore, courts have bound parties to contracts whether or not they have 
read or understood the agreement.124 Courts that applied these principles have found 
that online contract formation is no different from that of paper contracts, where a 
party may choose to sign an agreement without reading the terms. This is essentially 
the same as signing up for or using an online service without reading its terms of 
service.125
 In 2014, the Second Circuit, in Register.com v. Verio Inc., found that an online 
contract was enforceable even though the plaintiff never affirmatively clicked a 
button stating “I agree” to the terms of service.126 The court found that because the 
plaintiffs used the service on a regular basis, they essentially assented to the terms of 
the contract through their continued use, despite there being no affirmative evidence 
that the plaintiffs read or understood the specific terms.127 Similarly, the plaintiffs in 
Cullinane did not affirmatively click “I agree” to Uber’s Agreement, and yet they 
accepted the benefit of the services Uber offered, and so should have been bound to 
the Agreement.128 Even if they did not click on the Agreement, the plaintiffs used 
the services of Uber and accepted its benefit—a ride-sharing service—and therefore, 
assented to the terms of the contract.129 The First Circuit should have held that the 
119. See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75; Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
120. Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., 256 F. App’x 515, 518 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 23 (A.M. Law Inst. 1981)).
121. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 23 (A.M. Law Inst. 1981).
122. Id. § 69 (1)(a). See also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2004).
123. See Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 403 (holding that while the internet has exposed courts to new contract 
issues, it has not changed contract principles); Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 611–15 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2013) (holding that legal principles of contract formation do not change just because an 
agreement is online).
124. Schwartz, 256 F. App’x at 518.
125. See Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 403.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2018).
129. Id.
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plaintiffs, in using Uber’s services, essentially accepted the contract.130 Whether the 
plaintiffs read or even clicked on the terms of service button should have been 
irrelevant in the court’s analysis, as the Agreement would have been enforceable if it 
were on paper.131
 Due to the prevalence of online contracts in today’s ever expanding technological 
world, the First Circuit’s decision creates a jurisdictional split that will cause 
confusion in contract formation in apps and on websites.132 Because Uber and many 
other companies transact business online across all fifty states, their terms of service 
are susceptible to varying interpretations across jurisdictions—resulting in 
inconsistent applications of the law. For instance, the Second Circuit in Meyer held 
that the Uber arbitration clause was reasonably conspicuous, whereas the First 
Circuit found the same agreement to be unenforceable.133 Courts will struggle with 
whether they should follow the First Circuit’s analysis of what constitutes an 
unreasonably inconspicuous agreement or the Second Circuit’s analysis of what 
constitutes a reasonably conspicuous agreement—further muddying the already 
conflicting jurisprudence.134
 The First Circuit erred in its application of Ajemian and interpretation of online 
contract formation, and thus, should have looked to how other courts have handled 
similar issues. Instead of creating an arbitrary and confusing standard, the court in 
Cullinane should have concluded that the contract was enforceable because the 
Agreement was not buried at the bottom of a page, was uncluttered, did not require 
extensive scrolling, and was tied to the final process of paying.135 As a result, a 
reasonable user would have seen that Uber was presenting the Agreement as part of 
the registration and payment process. Further, because online contracts are on equal 
ground with paper contracts, the court should have found that whether the plaintiffs 
agreed to the “Terms of Service” was irrelevant in enforcing the Agreement.136 Because 
plaintiffs completed their registration with Uber and accepted its service, they 
implicitly accepted the Agreement, whether or not they affirmatively read the “Terms 
of Services.” Courts should be uniform in their enforcement of online contracts in 
order to avoid confusion and to protect the rights of companies and individuals.
130. See Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., 256 F. App’x 515, 518 (3d Cir. 2007).
131. See Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 401–02.
132. See Crespo, supra note 2, at 81.
133. Cullinane, 893 F.3d 53 at 63–64; Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2017).
134. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 64; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–81.
135. Meyer, 868 F.3d at 66; Fteja v. Facebook, 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
136. Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 at 403.
